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Is Democratisation Bad for Global Warming? 
 
Peter Burnell, Dept. of Politics and International Studies, University of Warwick, 
England 
 
Summary: even if democracy and all good things go together the same may not be as 
true of democratisation. Given the growing  number of countries that have attempted 
democratisation, with varying success, and as the challenge of addressing the causes 
of climate change becomes increasingly more urgent, it is worth knowing if 
democratisation makes that challenge more difficult. Similarly it is worth knowing if 
the political conditions for an effective response to climate instability and its 
economic and social consequences must impact on the outlook for democratisation. 
Although contrary to what was once believed, developing countries may not have the 
dilemma of having to choose between developing the economy and building 
democracy,  the further addition of a requirement to significantly reduce carbon 
emissions might be just too demanding. The paper offers a framework of analysis as a 
preliminary to more detailed empirical investigation. It concludes with policy 
implications for international actors committed to promoting democracy, considering 
that in developing countries stable authoritarian rule might be better placed than 
regimes in political transition to mitigate climate change as well as adapt to its 
effects.  
 
This paper inquires into whether democratisation matters for global warming. It 
argues that pending detailed empirical investigation there are circumstances where 
democratisation could frustrate efforts to mitigate climate change, irrespective of 
whether adaptation to global warming and its adverse effects make democratisation 
more difficult. The paper is structured in five sections: 1) outlines the paper’s main 
concern, which is a possible link between democratisation and action on climate 
change; 2) briefly reviews what the literature says about relations between democratic 
theory, democracies and the environment; 3) itemises international developments in 
recent decades that indicate why relationships between democratisation and climate 
measures are worth investigating, noting in 4) democratisation’s more  problematic 
features; 5) introduces the possibility that developing countries, China particularly, 
and possibly Russia too face a ‘cruel choice’ between democratising and reducing 
carbon emissions; 6) employs a figurative illustration to elaborate the dilemmas, 
incorporating the importance of regime legitimacy and regime stability; 7) presents 
international dimensions of global warming’s significance for democratisation, and in 
8) draws tentative policy implications for international democracy support.  
 
1.Questions worth posing 
The ‘third wave’ of democratisation appears to have slowed down and reached a halt. 
Figures provided by some recent measurements even appear to indicate some 
democratic deterioration in certain places, if not a more general reverse wave.1 The 
1990s saw the growth of a now well established multinational industry committed to 
promoting democracy around the world and arresting its decline. There is also now a 
widespread belief underpinned by growing scientific consensus that one of the biggest 
– possibly the biggest - challenge facing humankind is to slow down the rate of global 
warming. This means addressing the man-made causes: few experts now doubt that 
the scale and urgency of the required response are much greater than previously 
appreciated. Furthermore the impact of climate change especially severe weather 
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events on human security is already being felt on a local basis; and the adverse 
consequences of accentuated climate instability are predicted to increase.  
 
The conditions and causes rather than the consequences of democratisation have 
tended to dominate scholarly analysis of democratisation, with the partial exception of 
its effects on economic development, although the findings offer only modest grounds 
for believing that international democracy support can make a significant difference. 
However, in today’s circumstances it seems reasonable to ask whether 
democratisation matters for climate change, and whether climate change matters for 
democratisation. This paper focuses primarily on the first of these questions, in other 
words the reference to reducing greenhouse gases generally and carbon emissions 
specifically (climate mitigation), while noting also the implausibility of complete 
separation between the two issues. Democratisation might have consequences for 
climate change by making it easier or conversely more difficult to tackle the causes. 
But both the effects of climate change and adaptation strategies to soften the negative 
impact could be consequential for the prospects for democratisation, either indirectly 
by for example causing social and political instability or more directly by requiring 
solutions where some types of political regime have a comparative advantage over 
others.  The received wisdom is that globally both mitigation and adaptation are 
needed, but the magnitude of what comes to be judged necessary under the second 
will be inversely related to the speed and effectiveness of steps for mitigation.  
 
The paper’s primary focus, then may be represented in the form of a few simple 
questions: if the causes of climate change are to be addressed adequately, which 
means taking preventative measures to reduce global warming in the future rather 
than just reacting to and limiting the damage done by the consequences of failure to 
take such action sooner, then should hopes for democratisation in countries like China 
- now the world’s biggest carbon emitter - be put on hold? Would democratisation in 
such countries as China and Russia be a curse for climate stability? If democracy’s 
third wave goes into reverse could that be a blessing in this regard? 
 
2. A broad consensus exists on democracy and the environment. 
A literature called ‘survivalist’ and eco-authoritarian argued mainly in the 1970s but 
even lingering into the 1980s (see for example Gurr 1985) that ecological crisis in the 
none-too-distant future would be so profound that only authoritarian rule would be 
able to maintain order. The argument had two main strands: first, the issues are so 
technical that only experts can comprehend them, which means empowering popular 
ignorance would be dangerous for policy. Second, the destabilising and conflict-
inducing consequences of the projected economic scarcities and shortages of water 
and food specifically, plus increased health problems and aggravated migration flows 
will require or force governments to resort to authoritarian solutions, to maintain 
order or restore stability. A modern twist suggests this would be all the more likely to 
happen where there is already a history of authoritarian rule, as in East Asia for 
example.2
 
Democracy’s favourable disposition theorised 
From the 1980s on, however, a counter-literature, first theoretical and then 
increasingly empirical argued that democracy has distinctive properties which make it 
much better equipped than non-democracies to commit to environmentally sustainable 
development generally (see Payne 1995, Lafferty and Meadowcroft 1996, and Holden 
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2002 for summaries and elaboration). Briefly, the theoretical arguments state: 
democracies value human life and so will address threats to life, unlike autocracies, 
which prioritise power and ideology; democratic institutions are accountable to the 
public; democracies have greater openness and learning and educative capabilities 
compared to autocracies; the dispersion and decentralisation of power in democracies 
allows for a plurality of local and grass-roots initiatives (as in the US, where state-
level and municipal initiatives can take place even if central government is negligent); 
the implementation of government solutions to complex problems requires willing 
obedience and cooperation from those who are affected, and this is more likely to be 
forthcoming in democracies; elected governments (know they) can be held to account 
for how they respond to current prognoses of future problems, which means 
democracies are more likely to show sensitivity to the needs and entitlements of 
future generations; civil society, environmental non-governmental organisation 
(ENGO) pressure groups specifically can organise freely and help build influential 
multi- and trans-national movements. The literature that dwells on civil society 
especially is becoming more and more prominent. This is not just because of the 
ability of ENGOs to make governments sign and comply with international 
agreements but because of the potential to influence directly the behaviour of non-
state actors like big companies and consumers too. For example Newell (2008: 149) 
considers that civil society groups have ‘succeeded in bringing a significant and often 
under-estimated degree of democratic accountability to the global politics of climate 
change’.  All in all, while the literature does mention some counter-arguments, the 
dominant view is that democracy is helpful or, as Holden (2002) concludes, 
environmental protection requires democracy or at minimum the two are not 
incompatible.  
 
The empirical evidence 
Theorists disagree on the model of democracy or institutional form that is most 
favourable to the environment,3 but at the level of examining the actual record the 
poor environmental performance of the USSR and Soviet bloc countries compared 
with the West has seemed to offer convincing evidence for the proposition that 
democracy is superior to authoritarianism. This legacy has helped structure the debate 
over the last 15 years, not least by focusing inquiries onto the relative performance of 
different democracies. 
 
One caveat is that the majority of studies refer to performance on the environment in 
general; only a minority single out climate change specifically, which is a limiting 
factor for this paper. Also, methodological issues relating to how we can identify and 
measure the dependent variable for purpose of evaluating different political regimes 
are teasing, even after we narrow the focus to global warming, according to whether 
we are content to capture just the production side of emissions (burning of fossil fuels 
etc) or want to include also the contribution made by consuming manufactures 
delivered to the market from production sites abroad (attribution for ‘carbon 
leakage’). Both measures of course go beyond the simple but misleading marker of 
whether a country has ratified the Kyoto Protocol,4 while having the disadvantage of 
inviting us to decide on how to accommodate the role of lagged effects. Those effects 
refer to observable outcomes that are due to the policy initiatives of a former 
government (the people in office) and possibly a previous regime (type or system of 
political rule), which is relevant in countries undergoing political transformation.  
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Empirical evidence gathered in 1990 by Gleditsch and Sverdrup (2002) found that on 
a bivariate (but not a multivariate) analysis democracy’s effects on climate gases are 
harmful; Midlarsky (1998) too found democracy’s effects on carbon emissions are 
harmful, in contrast to other environmental effects; Walker’s case study evidence 
based around just three African countries also found a harmful relationship with the 
environment. A number of other statistical studies make more favourable comparisons 
with autocracies on environmental protection and sustainability generally (e.g. Ward 
2008), although even there the evidence is not straightforward. Neumayer (2002) for 
instance finds that although democracies are more likely to sign and comply with 
international treaties on the environment, the environmental regimes these give rise to 
are not necessarily effective; Bättig and Bernauer (2009 forthcoming) too find that 
while democracy’s effect on levels of political commitment to climate mitigation 
(policy outputs) is positive the effect on policy outcomes, measured in terms of 
emission levels and trends is ambiguous. Put differently, democracies are good at 
making token gestures; Neumayer (2002) concluded that the evidence for saying 
democracy and democratisation make a difference to actual outcomes is weak and 
ambiguous. 
 
A second caveat is that more fine-grained analysis focusing not just on greenhouse 
gases and carbon emissions specifically5 but which then disaggregates the category of 
democracies and the category of non-democracies in more detail would add greater 
nuance,6 especially if they go on to relate the findings to a comparison also of the 
countries in terms of both their level and rate of economic growth and development. 
Comparisons of carbon emissions by China and India today are at least as significant 
as say a contrast between Scandinavia and the USSR during the cold war years. An 
assumption that rich world democracies and poor world democracies have similar 
predispositions may be no more valid than the proposition that all rich world 
governments sing from the same hymn sheet. (Ward 2008 for example offers 
statistical evidence to show that presidential democracies perform less well on 
environmental sustainability than parliamentary democracies).7  
 
Furthermore, a number of both national and international developments of 
fundamental importance have taken place since the debate seemed to be sealed in 
favour of democracies, which should now prompt us to reopen and establish whether 
there is greater complexity to the case.   
 
3. Developments since the genesis of the prevailing orthodoxy 
First, as already mentioned, there is growing appreciation of the true magnitude and 
urgency of the challenge of tackling climate change, increased acceptance that human 
activity is a significant cause and, so, more awareness of the responsibility to act 
appropriately, which means mitigation as well as adaptation. We now have the certain 
knowledge that the Kyoto Protocol, which entered into force as recently as 2005, is 
wholly inadequate to the challenge. 
 
Three more changes, that are connected to the above include: first, countries in the 
developing world now contribute more to current and projected future levels of 
carbon emissions than before; second, increase in globalisation, trade and investment 
have led the production–side and consumption-side responsibility for carbon 
emissions to coincide much less now than they did formerly, when economies were 
less open and China was not a major exporter of manufactures; third, increase in 
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technical know-how, which has enhanced the possibilities for making energy savings 
and using alternatives to fossil fuels, at a price. Of today’s 20 leading countries in 
terms of their current total carbon emissions seven are in the developing world. They 
include countries that are likely to post high rates of increase in the years ahead.8 By 
2015 it is reckoned that total greenhouse gas emissions including emissions from land 
use changes in developing countries will overtake and then increasingly pull ahead of 
total emissions from the developed countries. 
 
However, there are also some things that have not changed greatly; or perhaps more 
accurately, they have come full circle. First is the knowledge that authoritarian 
regimes can be good for economic growth and development and in some cases 
perform much better than the average for all democracies. Whereas the economic 
shortcomings of communist authoritarianism are well known, a combination of 
authoritarianism and state capitalism still looks viable as a developmental alternative 
(witness China, Vietnam, perhaps even Russia today). This recognition (perhaps 
grudging in the West but nonetheless attractive to rulers in some other regions, 
Central Asia for example) comes after a period in the 1990s when much effort was 
devoted to trying to establish that democracies perform more strongly in 
developmental terms in the long run. However, even though the statistical evidence 
suggests a general fit between income levels and regime type in the long run, the 
correlation of high income and democracy is far from perfect, and our understanding 
of the causal link and direction of causality – if indeed a causal link exists – is even 
more limited, and is subject to much dispute.9 No less significant, ‘over the short to 
medium term variations in growth performance - that is, changes in income levels - 
appear to be only loosely related to differences in governance; here, studies 
comparing successful and less successful developing economies find that there is no 
significant difference in terms of their adherence to market capitalism and liberal 
democracy (Williams, Duncan, Landell-Mills and Unsworth 2009: 6-7).  The 
continuing relevance of the possibility of authoritarian development - or perhaps more 
important, the appeal this ‘model’ holds for illiberal rulers - should not be 
underestimated. If such regimes can reach a position where they have scope to choose 
between further growth and the environment without placing political stability at risk, 
then the significance becomes that much greater. 
 
A second constant, however, is that notwithstanding the conventional view which 
says democracies are more environmentally benign than autocracies, there is ample 
evidence that even people in rich countries, democracies included, are attached to 
energy- intensive life styles. These countries dominate the league table in terms of per 
capita carbon emissions even before counting in international aviation and shipping, 
or even as they displace emissions linked to the manufacture of goods they consume 
to countries like China and India (‘i.e. ‘carbon leakage’). These considerations should 
be taken into account when making use of the so-called ‘environmental Kuznets 
curve’ – an inverted U-shape that posits environmental outcomes will first worsen 
with rising incomes and then improve after a certain income threshold has been 
reached. Responsibility for carbon emissions may not be accounted for in all versions 
of the curve; and anyway, some commentators ponder that the climate change effects 
of rising incomes may even follow an N-shaped curve instead.10
 
Finally, there is one more big headline news since the debate on democracy versus 
authoritarian rule and the environment began to crystallise in favour of democracy: 
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namely democracy’s third wave, which saw many countries embark on 
democratisation. More than 20 years after the ‘wave’s’ inception we now see more 
countries classified as democracies of one sort another than at any previous time. 
Admittedly many of these new democracies do not count as full western-style liberal 
democracies and some may deserve to be qualified by an adjective such as partial, 
limited, or semi; moreover there is evidence that the total number has now reached a 
plateau, and some commentators speculate about the prospects for decline. 
11Nevertheless, this entire moving experience post-dates the early benchmark 
literature on democracies and the environment. 
 
4. Democratisation not unqualified good news.  
The real world experience of democratisation does not bear out an ideal type of 
smooth and linear progression proceeding inexorably all the way from autocracy at 
one end of the spectrum to liberal democracy at the other. On the contrary, what we 
see is a process of change that can be unpredictable and the outcome uncertain both 
for the identity of the government and the type of political regime. In periods of 
political transition both the government and the regime can be unstable; change may 
be halting and interrupted; it may first move forwards in the direction of more 
democracy and then backwards away from that and subsequently reverse the trend 
again. But such transition is not necessarily a brief passing experience. Indeed, 
political opening can bring about regimes that seem to be stuck in transition. That 
means that although the characteristics they possess places them somewhere between 
authoritarian and liberal democratic types they are not actually transiting or ‘in transit’ 
– moving in a sustained way – in the direction of one or other of these alternatives.12 
While the democratisation literature gives them many different labels like ‘defective 
democracy’ and ‘competitive authoritarianism’, and places them in classificatory 
niches dubbed ‘hybrid’ , ‘mixed’ or ‘intermediate’, to all intents and purposes they 
may appear to be stable and static, for the time being anyway.13 Yet inevitably there 
are still consequences for how decisions come to be made by the governments as well 
as who is making the decisions. Democratisation sometimes also brings a weakening 
of executive capability, the state’s ability to manage and solve certain sorts of 
problems. Established relationships and even the capacity to maintain stable relations 
with foreign governments and international organisations and the ability to execute 
international treaty obligations might also be disrupted. The literature has identified 
some disturbing examples. 
 
For example statistical analysis by Hegre et al. (2001) produced evidence to show that 
although in the long run established democracies are less prone to violent conflict at 
home compared to established autocracies (which is because established democracies 
seem relatively more stable), in contrast intermediate regimes and regimes undergoing 
political transition between autocracy and democracy are more likely to be conflict-
prone than either established democracies or established autocracies. Political change 
in either direction is equally hazardous; a succession of transitions in and around the 
middle zone means that a long time could elapse before a sustained net decrease in 
violence takes place. Mousseau (2001: 562) reached similar findings that regimes 
situated mid-way between autocracy and democracy have higher levels of extreme 
forms of political violence than regimes at the two ends of the spectrum. In ethnically 
heterogeneous societies autocratisation is more effective as a way of reducing the 
levels than by proceeding onwards to a fragile or immature democracy. Other groups 
of analysts writing more from an international peace-building perspective have also 
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argued that premature attempts to push a country to build democracy after 
experiencing violent conflict, for example by staging a general election early, can 
precipitate a return to violence, especially where the state is weak, thereby halting or 
even reversing the movement towards democracy. 
 
In regard to international relations several contributions by Snyder (2000) and 
together with Mansfield (2005) argue that even if democracies truly are predisposed 
to be at peace with other democracies, the likelihood of both internal conflict and 
external belligerence actually increases with democratisation.14 Their qualitative 
findings have attracted criticism. But they contain an echo from Ward and Gleditsch’s 
(1998) quantitative research findings that uneven or ‘rocky’ political transitions which 
involve swings back and forth do increase the risk of war proneness. These have been 
re-endorsed more recently, by Merkel (2008).15  Being located in a conflict-prone 
regional neighbourhood further accentuates the risks. Finally there are the debates in 
distinctive areas of public policy like macro-economic management that suggest 
democratising regimes have difficulty pursuing sustained policies of structural 
economic reform, unless they can show early dividends for key stakeholder groups in 
economy and society. The evidence for this is mixed: although Central and Eastern 
Europe’s post-communist countries have consolidated democracy notwithstanding 
painful economic transitions, Russia and countries elsewhere, in the Andean region 
for instance, have found the combination of liberalising economic and political reform 
far more challenging. Some have experienced interruption and even erosion of the 
early democratic gains.16  
 
To sum up the above, democratisation or democratising regimes as distinct from 
established democracies and established autocracies have been associated with some 
effects that are malign. Moreover the consequences such as increased conflict can 
further disrupt the process and contribute yet greater political instability, and invite 
democratic regression. Of course some of the reasoning that tries to explain this 
dwells on features that might be thought to have no direct relevance to any 
conceivable relationship between democratisation and the environment. The most 
noteworthy are the complications that divided societies pose and which lead to 
suspicions between different ethno-nationalist groups and to strategies of political 
mobilisation that serve to heighten the inter-group tensions. However by making the 
process of democratisation more hazardous and difficult to manage even this feature 
can have consequences for environmental commitments. Unlike the long, gradual 
development of some of the world’s oldest democracies, the reality for countries 
facing political transition now is one of societies beset by multiple challenges 
simultaneously: the challenges of fashioning democracy and maintaining a sustainable 
environment are but two among many. In some such places it is understandable if 
attention by civil society to the environment is crowded out by what are often hotly 
contested political issues concerning the direction and pace of political change, 
especially where a requirement to reconstruct - or even just ‘right-size’  - the state 
and, maybe engage in nation–building too compound the difficulties of democratising 
the regime.  
 
The testing political environment alluded to above, taken together with the darker side 
of democratisation and the possible effects, strengthens the case for raising questions 
about democratisation’s implications for global warming - a theoretical case that 
draws ‘bottom-up’ support from research like Walker’s (1999) study of Mozambique, 
 7
Malawi and South Africa, which provided empirical evidence for making a distinction 
between the environmental effects of democracy on the one hand and democratisation 
on the other, and evidence for saying that the second can be unfavourable. In order to 
focus on the connection more closely particularly in regard to countries in the 
developing world like China and India, old arguments claiming that developing 
countries face a cruel choice between developing the economy and building 
democracy are now worth revisiting.  
 
5. Revisiting the cruel choice 
A well known thesis in development economics in the 1960s maintained that 
developing countries face a cruel choice: they can either develop the economy or 
build democracy, but not do both at the same time. The reasoning is that development 
requires some politically tough decisions, notably restraining consumption in order to 
invest society’s economic surplus and have the possibility of increased economic 
production and higher living standards later. Democratically elected governments 
cannot be expected to make the rational economic choice: electoral competition drives 
politicians to promise increase in welfare now. Poor people living harsh lives in poor 
countries and especially where average life expectancy is short can be expected to 
‘overdiscount’ the promise of enhanced future benefits. The politicians make a 
politically rational response. So although the issue does not turn on elitist claims to 
specialised technical knowledge by government, of the sort that informed arguments 
favouring ecoauthoritariaism which were circulating around the same time, the 
conclusion nonetheless was that authoritarian rule is best for development. A 
normative inference that democratisation should be postponed until later can be seen 
to follow easily. 
 
For some years the strong developmental performance of East Asia’s non-democratic 
dragons/tigers appeared to confirm the cruel choice thesis on the one side, just as the 
poor economic performance of India’s democracy offered further support on the 
other. Just as important, cruel choice thinking seems to have influenced the way some 
governments have assessed their options. Put differently, the construction that power-
holders make of the political situation and the alternatives facing their country, regime 
and government is the main influence on how they choose to act, even where 
independent observers or critics of the regime take a different view and judge the 
rulers to be excessively confident, say, or pessimistic and prone to paranoia. 
Authoritarian regimes that lack strong, reliable two-way channels of communication 
with the people may be less likely than democratic regimes to make an accurate 
assessment of the policy choices that will be tolerated by society.  
 
In more recent decades than the 1960s the cruel choice thesis has been found to be 
flawed; by the 1990s even its original proponent had come round to a ‘nuanced 
revision’ (not complete abandonment - see Bhagwati 1995; 2002) after reconsidering 
the economic evidence. According to Bhagwati 1995; 2002) now democracies may be 
compatible and at times conducive to development – although only if accompanied by 
an expansion of economic markets and economic competition. The original reasoning 
and the grounds for the change of view mostly need not concern us here. But although 
nobody now argues that on average autocracies perform better in developmental terms 
than democracies (instead, collectively they show greater variation in performance), 
the idea that is encapsulated by ‘cruel choice’ should prompt us to consider whether 
developing countries in the early stages of the environmental Kuznets curve face a 
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trade-off between pursuing democratisation on the one hand and on the other hand 
taking steps to mitigate carbon emissions (and, perhaps, adapting to climate change 
effects as well). 
 
Democratisation or facing up to climate change: a new cruel choice? 
Do the developing countries that are not established democracies and China in 
particular face a new cruel choice, not so much between development and 
democratisation but rather between democratisation and the environment instead?  
 
Before exploring the question further it is worth recalling today’s orthodox view that 
democracy is more likely than autocracy to consider the interests of future generations 
and for that reason will be more committed to environmentally sustainable strategies 
for development. A supporting argument for this is that whereas democratically 
elected representatives can speak for future generations and their inheritance 
entitlements (in accord with Edmund Burke’s well known formulation of the idea of 
political representation), insecurity leads autocrats to ignore society’s future interests. 
However this comparison does not account for the future-oriented disposition of non-
democratic regimes that possess a strong nationalistic vision - perhaps one that is 
grounded in a long historically-rooted ambition for the country’s standing in the 
world, as in the case of China and Russia now - or the Arab world’s dynastic rulers 
and hereditary monarchies.17 Furthermore, the orthodox view does not speak to the 
distinctive situation of that large category of regimes that are undergoing political 
change and whose status lies somewhere between stable autocracy and stable 
democracy.  
 
In developing countries then the ‘cruel choice’ reasoning suggests that if government 
is to take rapid and substantial steps to reduce greenhouse gases or carbon emissions 
in particular, and if there is believed to be a trade-of with economic growth, then 
freedom from electoral competition and a concentration of power at the centre will be 
advantageous, relative to a more dispersed power structure and the requirement to 
refer political choices to the ballot box. Although democratising regimes might have 
the capability to combine political reform with development it looks unrealistic to 
expect society to allow such regimes to initiate climate mitigation strategies, where 
that is believed to mean sacrificing near term economic growth in return for the 
possibility of diffuse longer term global environmental gains. The scope for choice or 
the range of options that the politicians believe they face will be the determining 
influence. Any additional requirements to introduce measures to counter the harmful 
direct and indirect effects that an already changed climate has on social and political 
stability may conceivably strengthen further the argument for authoritarian rule. 
 
Put differently, China, the world’s leading carbon emitter, may be better equipped 
politically to reduce its emissions and respond to the harmful effects of climate while 
continuing to be an authoritarian one-party state than if it sets out along a path of 
political reform in the direction of liberal democracy. China’s polity today may be 
much better equipped than is India’s plural democracy to address climate mitigation 
and climate adaptation. Of course political capability by itself does not determine 
political choice, and the incentive for China to address its carbon footprint raises a 
different and challenging question. This paper does not pretend to address that 
question at length. However there is the possibility of increased susceptibility to 
growing international pressure and the effects of being offered technical support on 
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favourable terms from outside.18  And at home, the regime may calculate that making 
some modest particularist and substantive policy concessions to the growing numbers 
of China’s citizens who are already protesting the local effects of environmental 
degradation on their lives could be preferable to running the risk of being forced to 
introduce more fundamental changes to the entire political system later. If, however, 
China’s communist Party (CCP) genuinely believes that even under present 
circumstances political stability would be seriously threatened by a sharp deceleration 
in economic growth then why would it be more inclined to privilege climate 
mitigation over growth in a context of political transition - most likely a time when 
the party must engage in political competition while not yet fully reconciled to the 
idea that it might lose power?    
 
In order to broaden the focus out from the exceptionally important case of China, the 
next section first introduces the role played by legitimacy in stabilising regimes more 
generally, and then offers a diagrammatic figure (Figure 1) to serve as a heuristic 
device illustrating some alternative possible implications for the nexus between 
regime change, development and climate change. 
  
6. The importance of legitimacy, and a figurative illustration 
Political legitimacy and the contribution it makes to the political strength and stability 
of regimes offers a key to making sense of the range of options that different regime 
types face. More specifically there is a distinction between intrinsic legitimacy, which 
is where society accepts the inherent merits of the regime or system of rule by virtue 
of endorsing the values, norms and principles that underlie it or which the regime 
exhibits or claims to represent, and performance legitimacy. The latter obtains where 
legitimacy rests on actual performance in terms of delivering what people want or 
need, chiefly material welfare and personal security. The distinction is a familiar one 
in studies of democratisation. Legitimacy is the rock of political stability: it protects 
the regime from domestic threat even though it cannot guarantee that a particular 
individual, group or political party will occupy public office indefinitely. Indeed, in a 
democracy the voters’ ability to ‘throw the rascals out’ at the ballot box is often 
likened to a safety valve that helps protect and actually reconfirms the overarching 
regime - democracy. This is distinctive to democracies.  
 
A shift over time from performance to intrinsic legitimacy is generally reckoned to 
increase the chances of regime stability relative to continued reliance on performance 
legitimacy alone. And another view often expressed in the democratisation literature 
holds that democracy (i.e. government by consent of the people expressed in 
contested elections) is a minimum condition for a regime to have intrinsic legitimacy 
– the tacit inference (and, often, stated assumption) then being that autocracies must 
rely for their survival on either performance legitimacy or coercion and the threat of 
force against its citizens (the threat may be sufficient to ensure a largely passive 
citizenry, such that the amount of force actually used is modest), or some combination 
of the two. However, although economic crisis can make authoritarian regimes 
vulnerable (as in Indonesia and the downfall of Suharto’s 32-year long presidency in 
1998), some sub-types (military governments, for instance) may be more vulnerable 
and others less vulnerable (one party states like China for example).19 Moreover, the 
possibility that authoritarian and semi-authoritarian regimes may possess some kind 
and degree of legitimacy in the eyes of a significant number of their own people 
should not be excluded. Nationalism, populism, religious beliefs or some other factor, 
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perhaps just their reputation for being able to maintain order, are possible grounds; 
external legitimation by foreign governments and international organisations like the 
United Nations may also play a role. All this is important because it means the simple 
dichotomy that contrasts on the one side stable democracies and on the other side 
autocracies for whom economic development must be a priority if they are to survive 
is far too simplistic.20 Not only does it fail to recognise that authoritarian regimes 
themselves differ in their institutional nature (monarchies; personal dictatorships; 
military rule; single-party regimes, and, even ‘electoral autocracies’) with different 
propensities for survival and employing different strategies for survival (see Hadenius 
and Teorell 2007), but it does not speak to regimes that lie somewhere between 
democracy and autocracy, or fluctuate backwards and forwards in transition - the zone 
of instability. That said, we can now consider the relevance of these observations to 
the situation described in this paper as a new cruel choice.  
 
An obvious inference is that if strong growth and development are not a necessary 
condition for an authoritarian or semi-authoritarian regime to survive, then such 
regimes may be able to privilege environmental goals without incurring excessive 
political risk. Another is that if during a process of political change away from 
autocracy the outcome falls short of liberal democracy, perhaps creating a defective 
democracy whose capacity or willingness to use coercion or threaten force has been 
diminished, then performance in economic growth and development becomes more 
important to political stability: the regime’s ability to privilege environmental choices 
over growth will be constrained. A framework for plotting different countries and 
their specific situation in the light of  regime type and development is offered in 
Figure 1, although what the figure does not and cannot portray is how crucial a 
country potentially is to global climate mitigation. 
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Figure1 annotated  
 
The regime axis (horizontal axis) represents a spectrum ranging from stable autocracy 
understood as authoritarian and illiberal rule on the left to stable liberal democracy 
characterised by political freedoms and civil liberties on the right (regime refers to the 
type or system of rule, not the government in power). Data such as that from the 
Bertelsmann Index, Polity IV and Freedom House may be used to position individual 
countries. The section delineated by X-Y is a zone of regime instability: here, intrinsic 
legitimacy is insecure and performance legitimacy may play a bigger role than for 
liberal democracies and stable autocracies as well.21 The development axis (vertical 
axis) represents the scope for society to make choices between economic and 
environmental values, ranging from limited scope in very poor countries at the bottom 
to rich countries with enhanced scope to make choices at the top. Gross National 
Income per capita on a purchasing power parity basis may be used to position 
individual countries. Each of the four quadrants contained by the two axes can now be 
described in turn. 
 
The top right hand quadrant (A) depicts countries that compare favourably both in 
terms of democratic credentials and level of development or scope to make choices. In 
these societies democracy can privilege the environment at the expense of economic 
growth without putting the regime at risk (although governments might pay an 
electoral price). Examples include the US, Canada, Australia and western European 
countries and Japan, all of whom have a significant carbon footprint. 
 
In contrast countries in the bottom right quadrant (B), which depicts democracies in 
developing countries, face a significant trade-off between development and the 
environment, which means the choices are more constrained, and yet privileging the 
environment does not necessarily put the regime at risk. The actual consequences will 
depend on how much intrinsic (democratic) legitimacy the regime possesses relative 
to reliance on developmental performance (i.e. where it sits on the horizontal axis, 
that is to say how close it is to the zone of instability) and how much scope there is to 
make choices (i.e. where it sits on the vertical axis, that is the country’s actual level 
and pace of development). The number of countries in this quadrant that are critical to 
climate mitigation may be few but some of them are extremely important, for example 
India and Indonesia – the second perhaps not yet a stable liberal democracy. 
 
The bottom left quadrant (C) depicts autocratic regimes for whom privileging 
environmental values over development could be political risky (the risk being 
inversely related to non-democratic sources of legitimacy and the capacity and 
willingness to rule by force). But the hazard of instability increases if democratic 
reform is attempted at the same time. Countries whose regime falls inside the zone of 
the instability within this quadrant are the most exposed to a new cruel choice 
(between environment and democratisation). This is especially the case where the 
regime has to count on economic performance to bestow some legitimacy while not 
being able either to attract the full intrinsic legitimacy of established liberal 
democracy or rely heavily on coercion. This quadrant is probably quite heavily 
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populated in terms of the number of countries; China is probably situated in the 
quadrant but lies outside the zone of instability. 
 
Finally, the top left quadrant (D) presents wealthy authoritarian and semi-
authoritarian regimes that are able to make and survive political choices privileging 
the environment at the expense of development (environmental choices may attract 
public support anyway), and vice versa. Examples may be Singapore and some of the 
small Gulf states, who for instance have sufficient resources to invest in carbon 
capture and storage without severely depressing living standards. 
 
Overall Figure 1 illustrates the proposition that as poor countries successfully 
democratise they ultimately have greater possibility of addressing climate change with 
reducing political risk, and that progress in terms of economic development adds to 
and accelerates this possibility. It also illustrates that weak democracies in poor 
countries that are undergoing democratic decline and regimes that are stuck in 
transition may not be in a position to privilege environmental values without risking 
increased political instability, unless economic performance is moving ahead 
sufficiently strongly to compensate – an uncommon scenario. If an autocratic or semi-
autocratic regime is insecure and/or there is a commitment to democratise then only a 
sweeping transition to stable democracy may offer much hope of it being able to give 
priority to addressing climate change over economic growth.  
 
However, if the environmental case for embarking on climate mitigation is both 
overwhelming and urgent, then becoming more authoritarian or rendering autocracy 
more stable could prove a more effective response than a protracted, uncertain path of 
democratic transition. The salient questions then become how much time have we got, 
and how drastic must be the reduction in greenhouse gases – questions where 
scientific advice must be trumps.  
 
Figure 1 also suggests that even an authoritarian regime that is presiding over 
impressive development, China for instance, may not escape the cruel dilemma over 
whether to address climate change or democratise, until a certain level of 
development has been reached. And that while political reform or some combination 
of reform and development both offer China routes to an eventual position where 
environmental choices can be made without excessive political risk, the amount of 
travel required to reach that point, the length of time it could take, and uncertainty 
about the outcome might all be very great. This means China compares unfavourably 
with countries lying closer to the intersection of the dotted lines on the graph, Russia 
for example. The moral is that we might have to wait for China to get much closer to 
being a stable democracy, or to possessing a reasonably advanced level of 
development, and possibly both of these before we should expect it to be politically 
capable of reducing its carbon footprint. However the figure also shows that as Russia 
becomes richer there is no inevitability that environmental values will be given more 
weight, unless the country also comes to resemble a stable democracy or alternatively 
a stable autocracy in the meantime. For any country where stable liberal democracy is 
reckoned to be unattainable for the foreseeable future, and especially where 
development is and will remain very modest, the optimum political strategy for 
privileging the environment could be movement in the direction of stable autocracy. 
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Finally, an important caveat that should be noted concerns the implicit assumption 
that autocracies can impose centrally determined initiatives on lower levels of 
government and on society more generally, perhaps more so than democratically 
elected governments, where the state may have fewer legal powers and smaller 
coercive apparatus. This assumption might hold for stable autocracy. It will not apply 
in weak states and fragile autocracies. There is an important analytical distinction 
between the political freedom of a regime to make political choices favouring climate 
mitigation over the economy with or without incurring political risk (the political 
opportunity structure) and the executive capability to implement and enforce the 
policy choice, which is a matter of governance.  
 
The two sets of properties may well be connected in complex ways. Even so, the 
possibility remains that some new democracies especially in societies coming out of 
violent conflict, and a number of authoritarian regimes too, may lack the capability to 
put policy choices into practice and secure the intended effects. In fact there is an 
argument regarding authoritarian China that the leaders in Beijing could not easily 
reduce the country’s carbon emissions precisely because the centre has lost absolute 
power vis-à-vis the provinces and municipalities, where policy implementation is 
subjected to the influence of local and particularistic interests, corruption for 
example.22 A broadly comparable situation may exist in Indonesia following the 
decentralisation of power that has accompanied the country’s transition to democracy. 
Far away from Jakarta deforestation through burning – practiced in order to enable the 
substitution of profitable palm oil plantations - quite literally seems to be out of 
control. Brazil’s Amazon rain forest tells a similar story. And just as with the political 
incentives that structure the policy choices, it is the government’s own reading of the 
limits to its de facto power to implement, rather than ‘objective’ assessment by 
independent analysts that will be the determining influence. And as before, the 
accuracy of a government’s own assessment of its capabilities may be a function of 
whether the regime is authoritarian or liberal democratic. Incorporating the potential 
significance of this caveat for action on climate mitigation and adaptation not only 
requires refinement of the foregoing analytical framework but warrants detailed study 
in its own right. 
 
Up to this point the paper’s primary emphasis has examined whether democratisation 
is good for climate stability, the provisional finding being that it might not be good in 
all circumstances and could even be bad. This is relevant for international democracy 
support. But before inquiring into specific policy implications at the international 
level it is useful to set democracy support within a broader international dimension of 
global warming’s significance for democratisation.  
 
7. International dimensions of global warming’s significance for democratisation 
The analysis so far has proceeded at the domestic level. In order to identify possible 
policy implications for international democracy support some more general 
reflections on how the international politics of climate change could impact on 
democratisation can be mentioned first, thereby setting the broader context. 
 
First, there is the matter of international agenda-setting and the follow-through – 
policy agreement and implementation – as states seek to reach agreement on what to 
do, commit to put policy into practice and then co-operate with international 
monitoring on climate mitigation. As the various issues of climate change and its 
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effects (for example on local food security, coastal erosion, and so on) come to 
dominate international politics more than before, and as the spotlight turns on policy 
compliance, and as the full financial, economic and other burdens of taking 
appropriate measures begin to register more strongly, so the amount of time, concern 
and commitment that leaders in the West can devote to supporting democracy around 
the world will come under pressure. This holds true even before other looming issues 
like those concerning the state of the global economy or nuclear proliferation are 
brought into consideration.  
 
Domestic and transnational constituencies in the West that urge concentration on the 
large and varied basket of issues related to climate change, represented by civil 
society groups and non-governmental organisations specialising in the environment, 
or third world development, or both, and vested corporate interests already do 
command the attention of  decision-takers in governmental and inter-governmental 
forums. By comparison the democracy promotion industry is small, fragmented and 
elitist. It lacks well-organised popular support, although human rights issues 
conceived more narrowly is a partial exception. There are no powerful vested 
economic interests. Public opinion survey results in Europe indicate continuing strong 
popular support in principle for government action to tackle climate change, and 
continuing strong support for international development assistance to help the poor 
(who are most vulnerable to climate instability) as well. The US has seen a substantial 
decline in support for democracy promotion, especially among Democrats, whereas 
the imperative to increase national energy independence/security now enjoys high 
salience there (US crop substitution of biofuels for food production being a practical 
illustration that could have serious consequences for poor countries that depend on 
food imports, food aid in particlar).23 The attention paid by civil society and 
electorates in these stable democracies to substantive policies concerning the 
environment and third world development, rather than democratisation, stands in 
contrast to countries undergoing political change, where alongside economic welfare 
institutional and process issues concerning the regime, not climate change, tend to be 
uppermost for the most politically mobilised social groups. This contrast is likely to 
be all the greater where political change provokes or occurs against a background of 
violent sub-state or anti-regime conflict. That the one picture (in stable democracies) 
and the other (in the other countries) are the reverse image of one another points up 
the potential for tension between the different sets of objectives –economic growth, 
democracy, peace, environmental sustainability. 
 
Second, there is the matter of international bargaining. As the West comes to 
introduce more environmental incentives and/or conditionalities into negotiations with 
developing country governments, so those governments are likely to enjoy more 
scope to engage in trade-offs with - and escape the burden of - democratic 
conditionalities of the kind that have characterised international relations in recent 
years. This is a new version of an old scenario whereby developing country 
governments have been able to trade off against political conditionalities their 
agreement to implement the economic (and poverty reduction) conditionalities 
embodied in the Washington and post-Washington consensus and, since 9/11 in 2001, 
agreement to cooperate with western initiatives against international terrorism. A 
realistic expectation is that greater compliance with environmental conditionalities 
relative to democratic ones poses fewer political risks for authoritarian and semi-
authoritarian rulers. This makes it a rationally preferred option, especially if 
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additional encouragement is given by offers of international financial, material or 
technical assistance to help with climate mitigation and adaptation measures. 
 
Of course not all countries are open to influence in this way: none of the developing 
world’s leading carbon emitters are aid dependent. However, even trying to use just 
standard diplomatic means to persuade the governments of big oil and gas producers 
like Russia, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Iraq, coal producers (like Poland) and major 
energy-consuming countries to cooperate in international strategies for reducing 
greenhouse gases (and the trade in fossil fuels in particular) makes for a daunting 
challenge. Trying at the same time to persuade governments such as these to 
democratise, or to stop eroding whatever democratic credentials they already have, 
can only make the challenge more difficult. It could risk blurring the foreign policy 
objectives, and thereby serve none of them very well. Of course the displacement of 
interest in democratisation by global warming on the agendas of international politics 
would not have the same implications for significant carbon producer countries that 
are stable democracies already (US, Japan, Germany, Canada, UK, Italy, France, 
Spain, Australia, an so on), or even for stable democracies in the developing world 
(India, South Africa, Mexico, Brazil, and so on). However, the democracies’ own 
considerable carbon footprint does of course weaken the argument that democracy has 
superior environmental credentials vis-à-vis other regimes. And in turn it undermines 
the attempts of rich democracies to persuade other countries like India and China to 
reduce their emissions, unless offers of international help make such action 
compatible with continued development. 
 
Finally, although the most important carbon emitting countries are far fewer than the 
countries where the ‘cruel choice’ between development and building democracy 
might once have been considered a problem, or who now face a new cruel choice 
between democratisation and the environment, let alone countries belonging to both 
categories, many more developing countries and their poorest people are highly 
vulnerable to the harmful effects of global warming. And where harm is being felt 
now, the tendency to overdiscount the future benefits of tackling climate no longer 
applies. While this point may have little direct relevance to the prospects for the 
democratic outlook in these countries, it does mean there are added voices to the 
global coalition insisting that climate mitigation be placed high on the international 
agenda -  with implications for how much priority can and should be given to 
international democracy promotion.24
 
8. International policy implications 
The closer to stable democracy and the higher the level of development the greater is 
the possibility for regime stability and environmental preference to coexist. However 
this combination exists only for a minority of countries. Does the account of 
democratisation and global warming taken in its international context have policy 
implications for actors interested in supporting the spread of democracy in developing 
countries?  In the absence of more detailed evidence that compares countries and 
regimes against the propositions advanced so far, the paper concludes with just four 
very tentative and broad policy indications. They assume that notwithstanding their 
chequered history and the criticism offered in voluminous literatures too large to be 
reported here, both international development aid and international democracy 
support in principle can make a constructive contribution to achieving their stated 
objectives. Or, perhaps more relevant, these activities will continue to be part of the 
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international landscape, if only because of inertia rather than because everyone has 
confidence in their potential, or for some other and instrumental policy reason.   
 
First, international democracy support should seriously consider whether in some 
countries limited progress on democratisation may preclude significant progress on 
measures to reduce the causes of climate change, at least unless or until the political is 
exiting the zone of instability and comes close to being a stable democracy. However 
the countries to whom this might apply could be relatively few in so far as only a 
limited number make a significant contribution to global warming now or in the 
coming years. 
 
Second, international expectations, requirements or pressures on developing world 
governments to take steps to reduce carbon emissions should be mindful that the 
political consequences for regime as well as for the government could vary 
considerably across different types of regime, and across different levels of 
development. In regard to some countries, China for instance, if the international 
consensus is that climate mitigation really must take high priority then prudence may 
advise against trying to push China to experiment with democratic reform (an 
ambition that might be fruitless in any case). Moves by the centre in China to reclaim 
power, somewhat akin to what President Putin accomplished in Russia should, 
perhaps, be welcomed. If the power-holders in any country reject democratic change 
and for that reason foreign support to ENGOs offers a provocation that could stoke 
suspicions and fears about the wider political intent, then international offers of 
technical support for environmental specialists located within the policy elite may 
offer a politically more realistic alternative, as a channel for promoting climate 
mitigation further up the domestic agenda.25   
 
Third, for some developing countries that are boldly trying to democratise and take 
measures on climate change simultaneously, significant international financial, 
economic and technical assistance that reduces the developmental trade-off could help 
contain – or at least reduce local perceptions of - the political risks, during a 
hazardous time of regime transition. Put differently, democratizing regimes may 
require more such assistance than autocracies, in order that steps on climate 
mitigation will have the necessary support or acquiescence of the electorate. The case 
for democracy assistance that increases the chances of a speedy and successful 
political transition looks very strong. Development support that is tied to taking 
climate measures might make it easier for authoritarian and semi-authoritarian 
regimes to contemplate reforming the polity, but offers no guarantee of producing that 
effect or of securing a successful outcome. Development support that increases 
governance capacity, more particularly in raising local confidence in the capacity to 
implement climate change measures, must merit consideration.   
 
Fourth, developing countries that are already experiencing or likely to experience 
soon climate change’s harmful effects may be considered as special candidates for 
extra financial, economic, and technical assistance in support of adaptation and 
(where relevant) mitigation measures. A variety of national and international funds 
already exist to offer support for mitigation. But a raft of resourcing, management, 
policy, coordination and other tricky issues mean there is a long way to go before an 
orderly, systematic, comprehensive and efficient global institutional architecture is in 
place. Additionally, a UNDP/Global Environment Facility Adaptation Fund is due to 
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come into operation by 2010, but at the time of writing its prospective funding by 
developed countries has been criticised as wholly inadequate by governments of 
developing countries such as India. The World Bank (2008: 200) would appear to 
provide support for this assessment in its own estimate that ‘tens of billions of dollars’ 
are needed, if developing countries are to adapt agriculture to climate change. Making 
climate change assistance conditional on a commitment to initiating democratic 
reforms may be counterproductive: withholding support could increase the risk of 
political instability and/or the likelihood of increasing authoritarianism. However, 
little may be gained by ring-fencing climate-related support from democratic political 
conditionalities so long as vital development assistance continues to have such 
conditionalities attached.26 Making adaptation support conditional on the country 
taking climate mitigation steps may be a more promising option. But again, careful 
thought should be given to the domestic political effects of threatening to withhold (or 
actually withholding) adaptation support and thence the consequences for action to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions. 
 
Finally, the paper concludes with a plea for more comparative empirical investigation 
of the political dimensions. The combination of pursuing democratisation and 
development and tackling the causes of climate change undoubtedly poses a huge, 
politically demanding challenge for a number of developing countries that are 
important to climate mitigation. But the conclusion Walker (1999) reached after 
reflecting on his own limited case study findings bears repetition here, because of the 
implications for how the various conundrums should be addressed in the future: ‘The 
question should not be whether democracy is good for the environment but how and 
when democratisation, in its varying forms, can change the structures governing 
decision-making and access and control over natural resources in ways that favour 
social and environmental objectives’. Following up on this recommendation now 
would usefully steer the investigation away from the level of abstract theorising to a 
much firmer base,  one that examines more closely the variety of political contexts 
and their specific relevance to global warming and the lessons that could be drawn for 
international democracy support.  
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Notes 
1. For instance Polity IV recorded an increase in what it calls autocracies and 
anocracies (mixed or incoherent authority regimes) after 2005; in 2008 Freedom 
House detected a decline in freedom in one fifth of the world’s countries during 2007. 
 
2.  Professor Mark Beeson argued for this path dependence in a presentation on ‘The 
coming environmental authoritarianism in East Asia’, at University of Warwick, 19 
September 2008. 
 
3. For example Holden (2002) compares ideals of deliberative, participatory, and 
emancipatory democracy with liberal (elitist) democracy; Poloni-Staudinger (2008) 
investigates whether consensus democracies are more likely than majoritarian 
democracies to enact environmentally friendly policies. 
 
4. Russia eventually signed Kyoto with a prospect of being able to sell surplus 
emission credits – something that it subsequently (December 2008) decided not to do, 
preferring then to retain the credits for use once a successor to the Kyoto Protocol is 
established in 2012. China and other industrialising developing countries including 
India, Brazil, Mexico, Indonesia, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and most recently (2008) 
Turkey signed Kyoto without numerical limit on their emissions. 
 
5. Carbon emissions from fossil fuel burning account for around 60% of all 
greenhouse gas emissions, emissions from agriculture another 15% and deforestation 
another 10%. (World Bank 2008). Around 80% of emissions from agriculture 
including deforestation are from developing countries. Land use change also 
contributes to reduced carbon sequestration. 
 
6 . Statistical analysis by Quan Li and Reuveny (2006) suggests that although on their 
evidence democracies compare favourably with autocracies in terms of emissions per 
capita they do not perform better than the aggregate of non-democracies of all types, 
which include intermediate regimes (what Polity IV calls anocracies), which means 
that the inferior performance of autocracies compared with non-autocracies inclusive 
of intermediate regimes is the main reason. However this is just one, pioneering large-
N study that does not include regime change (i.e. democratisation and democratic 
regression) as a separate variable. 
 
7. Ward’s finding parallels the more general argument (discussed by Bhagwati 1995 
among others) that compared to parliamentary democracies presidential democracies 
are more prone to ‘gridlock’ in decision-making and more vulnerable to rent-seeking 
lobbies that have the effect of reducing the government’s capability to promote 
economic development. 
 
8. They are China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, South Africa, Iran and Brazil. Of the top 
20 only China, Russia, Iran and Saudi Arabia may be considered as not western style 
liberal democracies, although precise classification of the regimes in Russia together 
with Indonesia, Mexico and Ukraine is debateable and some analysts might judge 
them to be intermediate (between autocracy and liberal democracy) or undergoing 
transition. Of the top 50 countries ranked by per capita greenhouse emissions 
inclusive of emissions from land use changes in 2000, application of Freedom House 
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ratings indicates that 10 were not free and another 10 only partly free, in 2007; 
excluding emissions from land use changes only five of the top 10 were free. 
 
9. Authoritarian Qatar and semi-authoritarian Singapore are among the very 
wealthiest countries in average income per capita terms, whereas a considerable 
number of low-income countries now qualify as electoral democracies and are 
unlikely to achieve prosperity for the majority of their citizens in the foreseeable  
future. Even India, a long established democracy, now looks to be lagging far behind 
China in average income as well as life expectancy and adult literacy. 
 
10. The evidence indicates that while carbon emissions as a percentage of GDP 
decline after a wealth threshold has been crossed, emissions per capita continue to 
rise. One further element of continuity is the presence of other issues of major global 
concern whose demands on the attention of leaders often seem more pressing than 
climate change, such as terrorism, spread of weapons of mass destruction, global 
financial stability and the preservation of an open world trading system.  
 
11. For example the Bertelsmann Transformation Index 2008 says that 52 of the 75 
countries that fulfil the basic requirements of a democracy under rule of law ‘still 
have a relatively long way to go before they become functioning democracies’: the 42 
defective and 10 highly defective democracies show ‘major qualitative shortcomings’. 
Of the total of 125 states in the world a further 50 are classed as autocracies, of whom 
27 are deemed fragile states. 
 
12. Merkel (2004: 48-49) for example argues that defective democracies are not 
necessarily transitional regimes; depending on their political power, as well as their 
social, economic and cultural embeddedness, they can establish themselves for a long 
period. Societies with low educational attainments and clientelistic and patrimonial 
structures are especial candidates.  Hadenius and Teorell (2007) in their dichotomy of 
democracy and autocracy calculated that from 1972 to 2003, 77 per cent of 
breakdowns of an authoritarian government in fact resulted in another authoritarian 
regime either of the same or a different type. They found that monarchies and one-
party states are the most stable; and the most durable regimes are either highly 
authoritarian or strongly democratic. 
 
13. There is a large and confusing array of labels for regime types that are neither 
fully liberal democratic nor fully autocratic and, indeed, for sub-types of the two polar 
types. There is also disagreement over where the conceptual boundaries between 
distinct types and the sub-types are to be drawn, such that what one account considers 
a sub-type (of democracy for instance) might be portrayed by another as a separate 
type. 
 
14. For example, ‘democratisation is a cause of nationalist and ethnic conflict, 
especially in the early stages of the transition in states with weak political institutions’ 
(Mansfield and Snyder 2005: 88).  
 
15. According to Gleditsch and Ward ((2000: 26) ‘societies characterized by an 
incoherent mix of democratic and autocratic authority characteristics are almost as 
likely to be involved in war as are the most autocratic polities’, and societies that 
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undergo reversals along the path to democracy are more likely to become involved in 
international conflict than if democratisation proceeds smoothly without reversals. 
Merkel (2008: 488-94) in addition to noting that democracies fight non-democracies 
and often are the aggressor, too claims that ‘institutionally inconsistent hybrid 
regimes’ are less stable than autocracies and significantly more prone to violence; 
‘transitional regimes’ that do not rapidly consolidate are involved in civil war much 
more often than other regimes.  
 
16. The incentive to consolidate democracy offered by the prospect of accession to the 
European Union has been a major factor in the majority of examples from post-
communist Europe. 
 
17. The ‘ideologically-driven nature’ of  autocratic regimes that for instance Gleditsch 
and Sverdrup (1995) say renders autocracies more interested in power politics might 
be thought to work in favour of environmentally sustainable outcomes in the case of 
certain ideologies like some varieties of nationalism. Beckman (2008) offers a critical 
consideration of the political ethics in democracies of placing limits on the present 
generation’s freedom to pollute in the interests of future generations. 
 
18. Smith and Lennon (2008: 209) speculate that if the US government after Bush 
takes significant efforts to cut US carbon footprint, then China will become more 
vulnerable to external pressure to act as well; their scenario then envisages falling 
dominoes, as international pressure including pressure from China is displaced onto 
other major ‘hold-out’ states, India, for example. China’s current pursuit of soft power 
(understood as the power of attraction, in contrast to getting what you want by 
coercion or bribery) in international politics, linked to external perceptions of China, 
may be thought to give some substance to this speculation.  Instrumental socialisation 
into emerging international norms (‘logic of consequences’) may serve as a vehicle in 
this particular policy domain just as it has led some regimes to move in the direction 
of greater human rights and democratic values (and in some cases has led on to 
accepting the values for their own sake, that is to say a ‘logic of appropriateness’). An 
international burden-sharing arrangement on climate mitigation that is universally 
regarded as equitable would also be helpful. A different approach to answering the 
question ‘why would the leaders of China, India and so on tackle carbon emissions?’ 
relies on market forces: namely, pressure from ethical consumers in the West applied 
to these countries’ exports and exercised via the agency of the export-oriented 
multinational corporations that invest there. Issue linkage in international politics may 
offer another solution: President Putin’s decision in 2004 that Russia should join the 
Kyoto Protocol overrode his advisers but according to some accounts was part of a 
bargain involving European Union support for Russian admission to the World Trade 
Organisation. For further consideration of the international incentives for authoritarian 
regimes to engage with climate mitigation, see section 8 of this paper, ‘International 
policy implications’.  Of course the Chinese government’s 2008 White Paper China’s 
Policies and Actions for Addressing Climate Change (China State Council 2008) 
claims that a great deal is already being done by the government in respect of both 
adaptation and mitigation, and arguably the commitment is much more impressive 
than that shown by India. 
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19. Geddes (1999: 135). Geddes (1999: 138-40) shows why even exogenous shocks 
like an economic crisis do not necessarily bring down single-party authoritarian 
regimes; in fact, they are ‘remarkably resilient even in the face of long, severe 
economic crises’ (Geddes 1999: 139). Cuba since the end of Soviet material support is 
a good example. 
 
20.On autocracy and legitimacy generally see Burnell (2006); on how 
neopatrimonialism and ruling parties can both help authoritarian regimes to persist see 
Brownlee (2002 and 2007) and Gandhi and Przeworski 2007 on the similar 
contribution made by partisan legislatures;  for an example of how international 
support can help the stability of a (semi-) authoritarian regime, see Yom and Al-
Momani (2008); for externally-directed as well as domestic strategies of authoritarian 
protection and renewal by President Putin’s Russia see Ambrosio (2009).  A recent 
well known statement from the United States that autocratic values and ideas will help 
define international politics in the coming years, through a renewed struggle with 
democracy, is Robert Kagan’s, The Return of History and the End of Dreams, which 
claims that the leading autocrats believe in autocracy and believe they are serving 
their people: ‘Nor is it at all clear, for the moment, that the majority of people they 
rule in either China or Russia disagree’ (Kagan 2008: 60). Of course, perceptions of 
regime legitimacy, actual support for the regime, and popular strategies for regime 
maintenance are not one and the same thing, but they are connected. 
 
21. In its present form the horizontal axis encapsulates three different variables: 
regime type or sub-type, regime stability, and regime dynamics or change.  This is a 
weakness. A more complex multi-dimensional matrix or series of matrixes would be 
needed to capture the distinction between regime type or sub-type and regime change, 
which might be especially significant, as well as to differentiate between stable and 
unstable variants of the same regime type or sub-type (but in this matter empirical 
studies suggest there could be a correlation between stability and sub-type, for 
example monarchies seem to be more durable than rule by military juntas. See 
Hadenius and Teorell 2007). However the difficulty of disentangling the influence of 
(sub-)type and change of (sub-)type variables is well-known, as noted by for instance 
Hegre et al.(2001: 43) in regard to tracing the effects on conflict.. 
 
22 .The many writings of Paul G. Harris range over the political and bureaucratic 
obstacles to implementing environmental policy in China: see for example Harris and 
Udagawa (2004).  
 
23. Survey evidence based on data from Transatlantic Trends conducted annually by 
The German Marshall Fund of the United States. 
 
24. On the one side small developing countries like Belize, Guyana and Papua New 
Guinea lead the world in terms of producing greenhouse gases inclusive of emissions 
from land use changes, on a per capita basis. On the other side sits the Alliance of 
Small Island States (AOSIS), countries highly vulnerable to climate change, which 
numbers 43 states and observers drawn from all regions, representing 28% of 
developing countries and 20% of the United Nations membership.   
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25. I owe this observation on China to Professor Shaun Breslin. Harris(2008: 933) 
notes that ideas favouring environmental protection and sustainable development ‘are 
slowly spreading throughout the Chinese government’ and leading to a more 
supportive policy towards international environmental cooperation ‘driven 
significantly by scientists and other “knowledge brokers” who are gradually affecting 
policy..’ 
 
26. The effectiveness of aid conditionality and other forms of international leverage as 
an instrument for bringing about democratic reform appears to depend on the degree 
of linkage the country has with the West: the less the linkage the greater the 
likelihood that autocratic weakening will lead no further than competitive 
authoritarianism, rather than greater progress towards democracy (Levitsky and Way 
2006). 
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